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Considerable discussion and feeling has been aroused by the
contention which has been carried on in the courts during the last
summer concerning the Sunday opening of the fair. By act of
August 5 th, 1892, Congress donated $2,500,000 to the World's
Columbian Exposition with the provision that, if the gift was
accepted, a rule should be passed closing the fair on Sunday.
The gift was accepted and the rule adopted, but afterwards the
Fair Commission voted to keep open on that day. An injunction
to prevent this was sought in the United States Circuit Court and
obtained, but on appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals the judg-
ment was reversed and the injunction denied. The Circuit Court
were of the opinion that this Act of Congress constituted a gift
upon condition in the nature of a trust for charitable uses of
which a Court of Equity couid compel specific performance by
enjoining any breach thereof. But the Court of Appeals held
that, as it had not been shown that the United States would suffer
any damage, or that the corporation would not be able to refund
the money, there was an adequate remedy at law for any breach
of the condition in the gift. Until it had been proved that this
remedy had been exhausted, equity would not interfere. The fair
has consequently remained open on Sundays, and up to this time
we have not heard that the United States would attempt to recover
its appropriation.
At the opening of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts on
September 28, a breach of promise suit which was attracting pub-
lic notice very generally came up for trial. Reporters from the
different newspapers of Boston were present to get an account of
the proceedings. Judge Barker, who was presiding, directed the
clerk to enter the following order: "Van H. v. Morse. Ordered
in open court by the presiding justice that no report of the above
entitled case or comment thereon be made in the public news-
papers till the conclusion of the trial thereof, and that notice of
this order be given to the newspapers of the city of Boston."
This order being without precedent in Massachusetts, excited
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considerable criticism; and the newspapers, fearing to render
themselves liable for contempt of court, refrained from publishing
accounts of the trial. A similar order was given last January in
San Jose, Cal., in a divorce suit. The editor of a local paper
ignored the order and was fined one hundred dollars for contempt
of court. On the appeal of the case the Supreme Court of that
State decided that the editor had a right to publish what he chose
of the proceedings, basing their decision on the right of free
speech guaranteed in the constitution, and holding that what a
man may speak he may write and publish, and that this is the
freedom of the press, a liberty stopping only where it invades
another's rights.
An ordinance of the city of Chicago, resembling very closely
an act of the general assembly of Illinois, prohibited book making
and pool selling, with the proviso that it should not apply "to the
actual enclosure of fair or race track associations that are incor-
porated under the laws of the State." The validity of this ordi-
nance was tested in the case of City of Chicago v. Brownell, 34 N. E.
Rep. 595. The defendant, who was fined for a violation of the
ordinance in accordance with its provisions, contended, through
his counsel, that it was void because it was riot impartial, author-
izing pool selling and book making in certain places and prohibit-
ing it in others. The decision of the court was, that forbidding
certain acts in one place does not authorize them in another, and
the defendant was deprived of no right by the ordinance, as the
business in which he was engaged was unlawful before it was
passed, and hence it did not operate unfairly against him. Its
terms made no distinction between persons, but between places
only, and even if it were admitted that it sanctioned book making
and pool selling, if any one could engage lawfully in that business
at the times and in the places excepted, he could.
The case of Pe~ple v. Peck, et al., 34 N. E. Rep. 347 (N. Y.), is
interesting on account of the publicity given it during the political
campaign of 1892. It is the duty of the labor commissioner of
New York to collect statements relative to the departments of
labor, and he is given the power to compel, when necessary, their
production. Commissioner Peck was indicted for destroying
circulars issued by him, together with answers to them. The code
of New York makes it a crime to destroy papers filed or deposited
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with a public officer. The indictment was demurred to on the
ground that the answers to the circulars were the private papers
of the parties sending them, and that they were confidentially
given to the commissioner. The court decided that the labor
commissioner is a public officer and that the statistics which he
collects are not for his own private use, but for that of the legis-
lature and of the public, the main purpose of compiling them being
to base upon them legislation in regard to working men. Since
he is a public officer it follows that it is a crime for him or anyone
else to destroy papers filed with him.
Since women have begun to enter the professions it has become
a matter of interest what attitude the courts of the different
States would take with respect to their admission to the bar. In
many, the question whether they would be allowed to practice in
the courts as attorneys has already been decided. In some, such
as Massachusetts and Illinois, it has been held that without an
express grant of the privilege it cannot be conferred on them,
while in others, Colorado and Connecticut, for example, it has
been declared by the courts that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory inhibition, women may be admitted to the -bar, although
such an event was not contemplated either in the constitution or
the statutes. In re Leach, 34 N. E. Rep. 641, disposes of the
question for Indiana. In this case, the petitioner, although satis-
fying all the requirements of age, moral character and sufficient
knowledge of law, was refused admission on account of sex. The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision of the lower court,
and held that, as neither the constitution nor any statute limited
the right of membership of the bar to men only, but merely
assured it to them, and as there was no expression in the common
law excluding women from the profession, they are entitled to
admission, especially since this is in accord with the provision of
the constitution forbidding any State to "make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of a citizen."
